Public perceptions of the seriousness of crime have long been recognized as a legitimate topic of inquiry within the disciplines of criminology and social psychology, and crime seriousness surveys have since the 1960s been employed as instruments of that line of inquiry (Sellin and Wolfgang
with the 'meaning' of seriousness, respondents in surveys do not appear to end up in a metaphysical muddle when asked to assess the seriousness of an offence; 'no respondent balked at the task or asked what we meant by 'seriousness' (Rossi and Henry 1980: 492) . It has been argued (Needleman 1975 ) that the task of assessing offence seriousness is ambiguous since it may mean, depending on the interpretation of the respondent, 'level of punishment', 1 the 'damage inflicted', or 'wrongfulness'. But Rossi and Henry quote Needleman's own results to suggest that even if people are given clearly different but unambiguous interpretations of the concept of seriousness, fairly similar ratings emerge. Rose and Prell suggested in 1955 that perception of crime seriousness was a distinct concept and that, for example, there was not a high correlation between respondent punitiveness and the severity of penalties actually imposed by courts. Against this, Warr (1989) has found that two logical dimensions of an offence's seriousness (its harmfulness and its wrongfulness) are held differentially by different respondents. The seriousness score, rather than being straightforward, is a complex and confounded measurement, which 'disguises what are in fact distinct mechanisms of evaluation', one of which is consequential and the other intentional (Warr 1989: 819) . While our findings cannot resolve this issue, we did carry out an exploratory search for dimensions underlying the seriousness ratings and also examined the correlation between seriousness ratings and an independent measure of punitiveness.
How can perceptions of crime seriousness be measured?
A problem is presented by any attempt to quantify people's opinions on the seriousness of crimes. There is an implicit tension between ratings and rankings. Where a survey respondent rates one offence at point 8 on a Likert scale, and another at point 4, it is clear that the first is seen as relatively more serious than the second. It is not clear either that the offence is thought to be twice as serious as the second, or that this respondent views these offences more seriously (in an absolute sense) than another who also ranks the former over the latter, but at points 6 and 3 on the scale respectively. This problem underlies any discussion of the meaning of seriousness or of the validity of group comparisons. For example, if older people tend to give drug offences, on average, a higher rating on a Likert scale than do young people, are researchers justified in maintaining that older people view drug crime as more serious than do young people, even if older people tend to give every offence a higher rating than do younger people? Any attempt to standardize the scores and use, for example, distance from the mean as a standardized seriousness score would in turn depend on very great assumptions about the way people respond to surveys, as well as assuming that everyone has an identical mental conception of the 'seriousness distance' between the most and least serious offence items. While the unproblematical use of Likert scales as interval scales is ubiquitous in quantitative social science, it poses a special problem for seriousness scores where the mean ratings given by respondents are A further distinction is possible between predicted punishment (where the respondent^ view is heavily contingent on and deferential to the judgment of the criminal justice system) and merited punishment (where the respondent^ own views on appropriate penalties are central).
usually directly used as the basis for ranking the offence items. Although only the Likert scale method of seriousness evaluation was given to all respondents in this survey, both mean ratings and mean rankings are discussed and compared.
Is there consensus about crime seriousness?
How do different groups compare in their recorded perceptions of offence seriousness? Three distinct issues can be addressed here:
(a) Is there cross-cultural or international consensus on crime seriousness? While cultural differences regarding crime seriousness might be expected, it is difficult to find many national surveys within Western culture that indicate serious discrepancies between different populations. Roberts (1992: 137) , commenting on cross-national findings, argues that only on crimes of lesser seriousness does some local variation emerge, e.g. in France, the fraudulent naming of wine is perceived as relatively more serious than elsewhere (Ocqueteau and Perez-Diaz 1990a, b) . A 'substantial degree of concordance 1 (Roberts 1992: 136) emerged from an eightcountry cross-national study by Scott and Al-Thakeb (1977) . Sellin and Wolfgang (1964) argue that the 'offence items [used in their study] ... represent fairly universal prescripts and prohibitions in Western culture ' (1964: 323) . Miethe (1982) and Rossi and Henry (1980) also comment on the widespread consensus across nationalities. The present survey was designed primarily as a replication of a Levi and Jones seriousness survey in 1985 but examining seriousness ratings by an Irish sample in order to compare with their (British-based) findings. The results allow for a comparison between two cultures that have much in common but retain a number of distinct traits.
(b) Is there consensus, within a culture, between different sub-groups defined by sex, age, class, and educational attainment? There appears to be agreement on consensus, which is probably best stated by Rossi and Henry (1980: 491) :
Remarkable degrees of consensus obtain ... across populations within sub-groups [but the] ... agreement on the relative ordering of criminal acts is compatible with considerable differences in the absolute level of seriousness attributed to any given act.
In other words, differences between sub-groups' mean seriousness rankings of offences are small while differences in ratings are far greater. In terms of mean rating differences, the evidence is contradictory. Some theoretical work by Quinney (1975: 198) has asserted that the law exists 'as a device for holding down the exploited class, the class that labours, for the benefit of the dominant class'. One might expect that lower socio-economic classes would have a distinctive outlook on the seriousness of property offences, perhaps antagonistic to the dominant ideology (although see Rossi and Henry 1980: 495, against this possibly vulgar economic determinism). However, Sparks et al. (1977) found that there was a positive relationship between age and perception of seriousness, while lower social class respondents tended to view property crime as more serious. Rose and Prell (1955) found that women tended to be significantly more punitive than men towards child-beaters, bigamists, forgers, and drunk-drivers but not towards offenders who have committed assault, bribery, arson, or theft. Social class also had a significant effect although the relationship varied from offence to offence. Respondents from rural areas tended to be generally more punitive.
2 (A problem with the Rose and Prell sample is that all respondents were undergraduate social science students). Rossi et al. (1974) on the other hand found that dividing a sample of respondents into eight groups on the basis of sex, race, and educational attainment did not produce sets of ratings that varied much from those of the sample overall. Similarly, Cullen et al. (1982) reported no significant effect of age, sex, income, or community category on crime seriousness ratings. Walker (1978) did however find that men tended to rate violent offences more seriously than females and that people of higher social classes also tended to perceive violent offences as significantly more serious.
Several studies have also compared the general population with agents of the criminal justice system. Levi and Jones (1985) found that while police and public shared similar rankings of crime seriousness, the public tended to give most offences higher absolute scores than did the police. Corbett and Simon (1991) produced a similar finding with respect to traffic offences. McCleary et al. (1981) argued that lawyers tend to be more reliant than the public on legalistic conceptions of seriousness (e.g. victim harm was a less important dimension for them). In this article, differences between social groups (as defined by sex, age, education, and social class) are examined in terms of. their mean ratings and rankings. (It is hoped that the attitudes of Irish criminal justice workers can be sampled and compared in the near future). Following Miethe's (1982) suggestion, an examination of consensus on seriousness within these groups was also undertaken.
(c) Is there consensus over time about offence seriousness? Seriousness ratings and rankings in survey responses are temporally bound, and an issue that is sometimes overlooked is the rate at which they change over time. There seems to be agreement that relatively short lengths of time (e.g. a decade) may not have any profound influence on the perceptions of relative seriousness. Cullen et al. (1982) have suggested that although all offences were given slightly higher crime ratings across the 1970s and early 1980s, white-collar crime in the post-Watergate US came to be perceived more seriously, both absolutely and relative to other offences. Although there is a risk of confounding the variables of time and cultural difference, the use in this study (1994) of items common to the studies by Sparks et al. (1977) , and by Levi and Jones (1985) should allow some comment on change over time. Some interesting hypotheses have been raised on the relationship between time and the dispersion of seriousness scores. Chilton and DeAmicis (1975) have suggested that greater dispersions of the ratings might mean that the particular act is in a process of changing its relative seriousness ranking; where possible, this is examined below.
Methodology
After two pilot studies in December 1993 and January 1994, involving 50 people, the format of the survey form and the process by which responses would be sought were finalized. One thousand names were chosen at random from the 1992 electoral register (the most recent available) for the greater Dublin area: the Dublin Corporation and Council areas. Systematic random sampling was used. As long as no periodicities exist in the population list, the properties of a systematic random sample can be considered to be the same as those of a simple random sample (Sudman 1976) .
It was felt that the benefits of a postal questionnaire, especially the relatively low level of resources required and the non-contamination of responses by interviewer bias, outweighed the disadvantages of this method: the simplicity and transparency necessary in the questionnaire design, the threat of a low response rate, the absence of a skilled interviewer to guide respondents through problems they might experience, and the uncertainty over which member of the household had actually completed the form. Survey forms were sent to the selected people, along with a covering letter about the survey and a stamped addressed envelope. Anonymity was assured. One week later, a postcard was sent to remind them of the survey, and two weeks later, a further form, again with covering letter and stamped addressed envelope, was sent to outstanding non-respondents.
Six hundred and twenty-three (62.3 per cent) properly completed responses were received in the six-week period of the survey. A further 39 (3.9 per cent) survey forms were returned due to a change of address or death of the addressee (and bizarrely, in two cases, because the addressee was well below voting age). While other non-respondents may also have been unavailable for some reason, this suggests an effective response rate of 623/961 (64.8 per cent) which is satisfactory for a postal survey. There is good reason to believe that the respondents were representative of the original 1,000, and of the community. Keogh and Whelan (1986) have outlined the suitability of the Irish electoral register as a sampling frame. However, few if any sampling frames are perfectly representative of the population being studied and they argue that the register is biased against 18-20-year-olds and recent house movers who are likely to be in professional or clerical occupations. They estimate that about 4 per cent of those who should be on the register at any given time are not. The Dublin stockpile also tends to be somewhat less accurate than the Irish register in general. 4 The distribution of certain attributes among the respondents displays a very close match with the census figures for the Dublin population. The male: female ratio among respondents was 45.5:54.5, among the sample was 44.9:55.1 and in the Dublin over-18 population is 46.7:53.3. A comparison of the age profile of respondents with census returns from Dublin is also fairly satisfactory with the same proportion of 46-55 and 56-65-year-olds in both (14 per cent and 11 per cent respectively) while 26-45-year-olds were slightly over-represented, and 18-25-yearolds and those over 65 years old slightly under-represented among survey respondents. The rate of response by area was also fairly even, with 20 of the 25 postal areas in Dublin within 10 per cent of the mean response rate.
3 Thii process of tending reminders at intervals was based on Dillman'j Total Design Method (Dillman 1978) . Following Warr (1989), a modified version of Dillman'i method was used whereby the second questionnaire posting wa» not followed by a round of registered letters. The anticipated response was not considered likely to justify the expense, and further postings were thought to be over-intrusive on non-respondents. 4 In 1979, the Dublin registration officers were instructed to leave on the register any person about whom they had no definite information. This has increased the level of 'deadwood'on the Dublin register (Keogh and Whelan 198& ch. 1).
The respondents were presented with ten specific instances of offences, the seriousness of which they had to rate by circling a number from 1 to 11 on a Likert scale (1 = 'Not at all serious' to 11 = 'Extremely serious'; 6 = 'Of medium seriousness'). These ten instances were selected (as the most interesting) from 14 used by Levi and Jones (1985) in their seriousness survey. The items chosen (and the abbreviated name which will be used for each offence henceforth) were as follows:
Description given to respondent
(1) The offender attacks a victim with a knife and the victim dies. The offence items used by Levi and Jones (1985) were, in turn, mainly replicated from Sparks et al. (1977) . Some minor modifications were made to make all the items relevant for an Irish sample; 'social security' and 'police officer' in Levi and Jones become 'social welfare' and 'Garda officer' respectively; and just as Levi and Jones, when reproducing from Sparks et al. offences involving a specific financial amount, increased the amount to match inflationary change, we also changed the amount to deal roughly with inflation and the slightly lesser buying power of the Irish pound. Sheley (1980) found that there was no significant order-effect in offence presentation. On this basis, no randomization between subjects was used and the order given above (which was devised randomly) was the one presented to all respondents. One modification was introduced, however, from information gained at the pilot study stage. It was found that a substantial minority of respondents were 'fixing' on to a score of 11 for all items, thus indicating that they found all the offences extremely serious but not distinguishing between them. In the light of this, it was decided that 'murder' would be placed first in the list for the actual study in order to act as a sort of anchor or standard, as it was assumed that for the vast majority of respondents, murder would be seen as at least as serious as any other crime and might encourage a wider use of the scale by respondents.
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A punitive scale was also devised against which to compare the seriousness score. This involved using the same ten descriptions as given above, but asking the respondents to indicate what they thought would be an appropriate penalty for a repeat offender (who had never before been imprisoned) for each of these offences. The respondents were offered three actual penalties but were also invited to write in their own sentence if none of the presented penalties were deemed suitable. The penalties were devised through an informal survey of a number of legal practitioners who were asked in the case of each offence to estimate the likely penalty that would be handed down in an Irish court. For each offence, we then added to this estimate a lower and a higher sentence thus producing three possibilities for the respondent. For example, it was suggested that a sentence of two years' imprisonment might be given to a repeat offender convicted of burglary of even a small amount; the more lenient option added was 100 hours' Community Service, the more punitive a term of five years in prison. The data from this section were then treated as a three-category ordinal scale, since in practice, only a small number of respondents used the write-in option and these were ultimately recoded into one of the three categories. This coding was a priori the actual statistical analysis and obviously required some subjective decisions to be made, e.g. capital punishment was considered to be in the most punitive category for murder (or indeed for any of the offences) and corporal punishment where given for some of the offences was also deemed to be in the most punitive category.
The respondents were finally asked to give some information about themselves. Age was categorized into six groups (18-25, 26-35, 36-45, 46-55, 56-65 and 65+ years old) . Educational attainment was also categorized into six groups with primary school education only up to university degree level. Raw data on social class were obtained by asking the respondents to specify their current or most recent employment. These were post coded into three categories: self-employed/professional/ managerial; white-collar worker; blue-collar/unemployed worker. Where someone was living with a partner of a higher socio-economic grouping, the respondent was given the code that corresponded to that of his/her partner.
Results and Discussion
As has been done in a number of earlier studies, the results of the crime seriousness Likert scaling exercise will initially be treated as if they can be used as an interval scale, in respect of which there is a common understanding among respondents of the absolute value of the various points on the scale. The questions raised in the introduction will be addressed on this basis. In answer to those who have doubted whether crime seriousness ratings can be used in this way, the latter part of the article will be devoted to an analysis of the results as an ordinal scale, based on mean rankings.
What is meant by crime seriousness? It has been suggested that seriousness may be perceived by a respondent as having the same meaning as 'deserving of punishment ' and Hawkins (1980) has offered some evidence for this position. On this basis, it was hypothesized that a correspondence would exist between the variables of punitiveness and seriousness and that, for example, those respondents who were in the high punitive category on a particular offence should also have significantly higher seriousness scores for that offence than did those in the medium and low punitive scores. One-way anovas were carried out for the three punitiveness groups and the result was significant for all ten offences. As can be seen in Table 1 , the hypothesis was largely confirmed.
For nine of the offences, the least punitive group had the lowest score, the most punitive group had the highest seriousness score and the medium punitive group had a mean seriousness score that fell between the other two scores. In six of these nine offences, a Newman-Keuls test on differences between the seriousness scores of the three groups showed that the difference between each group was significant (0.05 level), while for dole fraud, fraud on the public and the corrupt Garda, the lowest group's ratings were significantly different from those of the medium and high punitive groups, but the medium and high punitive group ratings were not significantly different from each other. However, while those who were low punitive had the least serious mean score for the seriousness of marijuana selling, the medium punitive group gave a (not significantly) higher mean seriousness rating than did the high punitive group. Overall, the direction of the means in nine of the cases, with the differences between the groups generally significant, seems to indicate that seriousness perceptions and choice of appropriate penalties do seem to match strongly. That levels of punitiveness and perceptions of seriousness seem to be related for each offence does not of course provide firm evidence that seriousness and punitiveness are in reality one and the same measure; nevertheless it might not be too imprudent to believe, for example, that perceptions of offence seriousness may be a good predictor of beliefs about penalty severity. This is borne out by other studies (Blumstein and Cohen 1980; Hamilton and Rytina 1980) . As will be seen, the connection between perceptions of offence seriousness and punitiveness may provide a useful basis for the assessment of sentencing practice. Pease (1988) has however suggested that while offence seriousness and sentence severity are related, the relationship is a complex one and the researcher should be aware that other factors such as the type of offence (property versus personal crime) as well as the status of the respondent (victim versus non-victim) may introduce non-linear interactions between seriousness and severity.
However, evidence was also found for Warr's (1989) suggestion that 'seriousness' is a complex variable; specifically he suggested that it is comprised of distinct dimensions of wrongfulness (normative) and harmfulness (factual) to which people give different weights in different circumstances. These dimensions are not mutually exclusive: the one criminal act can be both contrary to social norms (wrong) and inimical to those immediately affected by it (harmful); but Warr found that most people rated offences' seriousness with reference to whichever quality predominated. In legal discourse, a loosely related set of dimensions, 'intentionality' and 'consequentiality' is also widely employed. In order to investigate this possibility of seriousness having a composite nature, a principal components analysis was carried out following the examination of the correlation matrix between seriousness scores presented in Fig. 1 below.
Two points can be made about the correlation matrix; first, while in general the intercorrelations are high, the data do not lend themselves easily to an 'intuitive factor analysis' (see Gorsuch 1974: 6) and more rigorous analysis is necessary. Secondly, the seriousness of 'murder' is quite weakly correlated with the other seriousness scores; this is because the variance of murder seriousness is relatively low since so many respondents gave this a score of 11. It was decided after some consideration to leave this variable in the principal components analysis since, for reasons that will become clear, it does not particularly affect the possible underlying dimensions and may even make them easier to interpret. The principal components analysis (orthogonal) was carried out, and on the basis of the eigen values and an examination of the scree plot, two factors were extracted which are presented below in Fig. 2 .
It was tempting to try to impose either a wrongful/harmful or intentional/ consequential reading on the factor analysis, as our interpretation is closely related and indebted to these distinctions. However, in the light of the different methodologies used, and of the danger that merely similar phenomena might come to be seen as synonymous, it was decided to use a distinctive (if less elegant) terminology for the two major dimensions of seriousness disclosed in the views of the survey respondents. These are varying degrees of'badness' (factor 1); and of'individual impact' (factor 2). 7 Factor 1 explained 42.3 per cent of the variance while factor 2 explained 10.3 per cent of the variance, giving a total of 52.6 per cent variance explained.
It is clear, if we consider these dimensions, that they are not unrelated to each other, in fact they are likely to be negatively correlated; in many situations, the degree of badness is surely influenced by the level of harmful impact on the individual. Therefore it seemed sensible to carry out the principal components analysis again, but this time obliquely, and to allow the extracted components to correlate with one another. However, the differences between these data and the results of the orthogonal rotation were negligible.
The results of the orthogonal rotation were graphed, and are presented in Fig. 3 below. The roughly diagonal nature of the pattern in this figure indicates the overlapping of the two dimensions. For example, murder is seen, reasonably enough, as very high on 'individual impact' and as indicating a high degree of 'badness'. However, the dimensions appear to have their validity demonstrated, for example, in the case of the corrupt Garda, which is among the higher in degrees of badness, but is relatively lowly placed for 'individual impact'. In fact, the corrupt Garda has roughly the same 'individual impact' co-ordinate as fraud on the public, which seems intuitively correct.
Examining the vertical distribution ('individual impact'), we find five clusters; the lowest are classically 'victimless' crimes such as dealing in soft drugs and consensual underage sex. In the next cluster (fraud on business and dole fraud), there is a victim, but it is either diffuse or is an impersonal institution, so that the impact on any particular individual is diluted. The following cluster (corrupt Garda, fraud on the public) is more complex. Fraud on the public again has a diffuse nature but it might be seen to be somewhat more concentrated than the offences just discussed, as it is not the general public but a small number of people that is harmed by the offence. The instance of Garda corruption, on the other hand, is more individualized in its impact, but involves only a very small material loss. The final two clusters (burglary, mugging and assault on a Garda; and murder, respectively) show an increasing level of individualized violation either of a person or of his/her property. Looking horizontally (at the 'degree of badness'), we can note that the 'victimless' crimes have clustered with fraud crimes; thus, although they are seen as causing little harm, they are still perceived as violating social norms, as much as the fraudsters (in fact slightly more so in the case of the fraud on business). These dimensions are obviously not complete explanations of the processes brought to bear by respondents when considering seriousness; the survey is an imperfect tool of measurement and the analysis leaves 47.4 per cent of the variance unexplained. None the less, our interpretation would suggest that people think mainly of degree of badness of the offending conduct and of the offender who commits it, but also, to a lesser extent, try to estimate the impact on the victim when considering seriousness of an offence. That these dimensions have a rough similarity to other dimensions considered by researchers in the field such as wrongfulness/harmfulness and intentionality/consequentdality may support our reading of the underlying factors at work. A word of caution is necessary, however, in respect of the above use of the principal components analysis. This statistical technique can pick up variance among the respondents about the offences, particularly in the first principal component extracted. Thus, while a high factor loading for an offence shows that that factor or dimension is an important one for respondents when they assess its seriousness, it can also suggest a wide spread of opinion among respondents about that dimension of seriousness. Consensus and dissensus among respondents is considered further below through an analysis of the variance. The factor scores for each respondent were saved for use in that analysis.
An interpretation of both the punitiveness findings and the factor analysis (which goes beyond the data somewhat) is that seriousness and 'deserving of punishment' are for most offences really the same thing for the respondents. The seriousness or 'deserved punishment' for any particular offence is in turn a function of the relative weight given to normative 'badness' and to the 'individual impact' of the offence on the victim.
Consensus about crime seriousness
Is there cross-cultural or international consensus on crime seriousness? Is there consensus over time about crime seriousness?
The comparison between ten mean offence ratings from Levi and Jones's (1985) British sample and this survey sample of Irish respondents is presented below in Table 2 . The findings can be rendered more reliable by conservative reporting of crimes that are perceived as less or more serious than others. This was done by recording that offence A was more serious than offence B only if the mean rating of offence A was significantly (statistically) greater than that for offence B using a paired t-test. The robust 0.01 level of significance was employed in order to avoid a type 1 error (incorrectly rejecting a true null hypothesis), which has an increased probability with a family of t-tests. If the offences did not differ significantly, they were given shared rankings.
Another way to represent the data is as follows in Fig. 4 . (A column representing six offences that are matched in the mean seriousness ratings of Sparks et al. has been added).
Comparing the Levi and Jones data with our own, what is at first striking is the similarity between the rankings despite the differences in sample population and time. The first five rankings (based on mean ratings) are the same and any noticeable change has only occurred with less serious offences. It is also interesting to examine the degree of consensus on the seriousness scores throughout the whole sample. Both this study and Levi and Jones found that as offences are rated less seriously, there tends to be a greater degree of dispersion of scores away from the mean, showing that there is more consensus on more serious crimes. (However, there is also evidence that if a range of very trivial crimes is presented, consensus reappears : Warr 1989: 816) . The correlation between seriousness and dispersion for Levi and Jones is r 2 = 0.858 and, for this survey, r 2 = 0.770. How can the variations in seriousness ratings be explained? The problem here, as was noted above in the introduction, is that differences may arise artificially (sampling error), may represent somewhat different cultural perspectives or may be a consequence of change over time. The fact that differences in seriousness between the two surveys are not unidirectional (one survey's mean seriousness ratings are not higher for all offences) provides some evidence that the differences are at least not purely artifactual.
However, this still leaves the potentially confounding influences of time and cultural differences. Chilton and DeAmicis (1975) have suggested that a large dispersion of seriousness ratings, as indicated for example by a high standard deviation (SD) around a particular offence, may signal a coming change in relative position of seriousness for that offence. This hypothesis may be borne out when the SDs of the Levi and Jones offences are examined. In their study, there are three offence seriousness SDs above 3.00. (This threshold is chosen arbitrarily but as can be seen in Table 2 , there does appear to be a natural break between the SDs above and below this figure.) These three offences (marijuana sale, dole fraud, and underage sex) are the ones that have been subject to the most marked change between the 1985 and 1994 studies, since they are the only ones to have changed both in relative position and (in some cases very substantially) in mean seriousness rating. We must ask what this dispersion from the mean ratings reflects, and why it could be expected to predict changes in perceived seriousness over time?
One possible interpretation of this is that these are offences which in the principal component analysis load very weakly on the 'individual impact' dimension identified from the factor analysis. The strong dispersion of these scores may be a function of the dimension along which the offence is primarily viewed, since these offences disclose a moderate 'degree of badness' (compared, e.g., to fraud on the public or on business) but cause virtually no harm to an individual victim. Thus a shift in priority (between cultures or social groups) from 'badness' to 'individual impact' will have a stronger effect on these offences than in respect of offences where these two dimensions are very tightly correlated and where the effect of such a change would thus be less discernible. For example, the fact that underage sex is taken more seriously in Ireland may indicate that sexual 'wrongdoings' are culturally more likely than in Britain to be interpreted primarily along a 'degree of badness' rather than an 'individual impact' dimension, for various historical and religious reasons. Similarly, a strongly dispersed set of scores for a particular offence (indicated by a high SD) may signal that this offence is of a type where there is least concordance between 'degree of badness' and 'individual impact' and is thus vulnerable to relatively strong shifts over time in seriousness rating if the weight given to either dimension changes.
Is there consensus, within a culture, between different sub-groups defined by sex, age, class, and educational attainment?
Quite apart from the doctrinal debate over conflict and consensus, findings in this area may be capable of practical application. It is a philosophical or political question whether policing and sentencing practice should respond to public preferences. However a degree of social consensus about the relative seriousness of offences must be necessary if such a policy, once chosen, is to be capable of relatively uncontroversial implementation.
One-way anovas were carried out in order to compare how social groups (as defined by sex, age [six groups], educational attainment [six groups] and social class [three groups] differed in their perception of seriousness. Class did not appear to have a significant effect on seriousness scores and education only had an effect on the marijuana sale item (the general trend indicated that as people became more educated they tended to view it as less serious). Sex had a highly significant effect on the perception of underage sex, marijuana sale, and fraud on both the public and on the company (with females perceiving all of these as more serious). Age had a significant effect on all the offences except the dole fraud, the corrupt Garda, and the murder. The relationship between age and seriousness was unclear for the assault on the Garda and the fraud on business while there appeared to be a bell-jar pattern to the seriousness scores of the burglary and the mugging (with the middle-aged perceiving these offences as more serious than did either the young or the elderly). There was a positive relationship between increasing age and increased perceived seriousness for underage sex, marijuana sale, and fraud on the public. Following Miethe's (1982) suggestion, the variances for the anovas were examined for differing degrees of within-group consensus but they seemed fairly uniform. It was difficult to discern any pattern in the dispersion scores of various sub-groups. It was, unsurprisingly, the offences that had the highest overall standard deviations that also demonstrated the most dispersion within groups. However, it was not the case that a stable pattern could be found to explain the dispersion scores. For example, while women and elderly people had a lower standard deviation for marijuana selling than male or younger respondents respectively (standard deviation for males was 3.52, for females 3.10, for those aged between 18-25, SD = 3.43, N=121 and for those over 65 + , SD = 2.70, N=60). However, if the dispersion scores for underage sex are examined, we find males are more 'consensual' than females (male SD = 3.10, females = 3.35) and the young and old show similar levels of agreement (18-25 group, SD = 3.23, 65 + , SD = 3.24) while scoring very differently on the seriousness of this offence (the young with a mean seriousness score of 5.08 and the elderly giving a mean score of 7.02).
There is a problem with the interrelationship between the categories, for example older respondents tended to have lower levels of education, so a finding that better educated respondents tended to view the marijuana sale as less serious than did the less well educated may simply be a refraction of the fact that older people thought it more serious than did younger people. The influence of socio-demographic variables can be most parsimoniously described in terms of their interaction with the factor scores that were assigned to the respondents above, while possible confounding effects can be controlled for by using multiple regression. The four variables (age, sex, class, and education) were treated as dummy variables and two multiple regressions were carried out with the dependent variable in each case being either factor score 1 ('degree of badness') or factor 2 ('individual impact').
With factor 1 as the dependent variable, three independent variables, sex, education, and age could explain a significant amount of the variance (p = 0.000). Class, interestingly, had no significant effect. The betas indicated that females had a higher seriousness score on the badness dimension than had men (beta = 0.20). Older respondents also had a significantly higher score on the badness dimension than had younger respondents (with six age groupings, beta = 0.14). The beta for education was -0.10 indicating that increasing education led to a lowered seriousness score along the dimension of badness.
With factor 2 as the dependent variable, only sex had a significant effect. Females viewed offences that loaded heavily on the harm to victim dimension as more serious (p = 0.039, beta = 0.09). The other independent variables, education, age and class had no significant effect on this factor. To put it another way and perhaps more simply, strong effects of sex, education, and age emerged for offences that tended to be relatively less serious, to have a greater dispersion of scores and that loaded highly on factor 1. The effects of these socio-demographic variables were much weaker or nonexistent (only sex was still significant) with those offences which loaded heavily on factor 2 and those were the offences that tended to be more serious and which tended to have a smaller dispersion of scores.
Mean rankings and relative seriousness
As was noted in the introduction, it is not uncontroversial to treat seriousness ratings as interval scores. The various tests performed above are useful only if the scale can legitimately be used as an interval scale, in respect of which there is a common understanding among respondents of the absolute value of the various points on the scale. However, if some respondents (e.g. females, the older age groups) used the scale differently to others (e.g. males, the young) and gave generally higher scores for all offences, the finding that age or sex has an effect on seriousness scores may be purely an artifact of the survey method, rather than an expression of any real difference of opinion on crime seriousness. How can this possibility be investigated? First, it can be shown that older and female respondents do overall give significandy higher total seriousness scores. The mean seriousness score for females for the ten seriousness items is 9.50 while for males, it is 8.68 (t = 0.000) while a one-way anova for differences between the six different age groups is also significant (p = 0.000) with a positive relationship between age and die perception of seriousness.
It can be seen therefore that there could be an argument that the group differences arise from methodology, not real difference. While this criticism is weakened by the fact that the effect varies from offence to offence, none the less it is still generally present. To deal with this issue, the notion of relative seriousness was re-examined. If one respondent grades everything as a little more serious than does another, this does not tell the researcher whether the first respondent thinks that a particular offence is relatively more serious (compared to other offences) than does another respondent. To address this issue of relative seriousness, the data were transformed so that for each respondent, scores for the ten offences were ranked relative to each other. Thus, each respondent then had his/her own set of ten rankings for crime seriousness. It then becomes possible to compare the mean seriousness ranking given to particular offences in order to examine whether some offences were ranked higher or lower relative to the other nine offences by different groups.
Using a Kruskal-Wallis to compare different age groups' mean seriousness rankings, age was found to have a significant effect on the ranking given to burglary, marijuana sale, fraud on a company, and the corrupt Garda. The pattern was unclear for fraud on business, the perception of the seriousness of marijuana selling increased perfectly with age, the perception of the corrupt Garda decreased almost perfecdy with increasing age and it was the middle-aged groups who perceived burglary as most serious. A Mann-Whitney test indicated that sex has a significant effect on the relative rankings given to burglary, dole fraud, marijuana sale, underage sex, and mugging. Males give mugging, burglary, and dole fraud a relatively higher rank of seriousness than do females, while females rank underage sex and marijuana selling as relatively more serious than do males.
How do we interpret two different analyses of the same data? We can compare Table 3a , which is based on the ratings of the offences, and Table 3b , which is based Aged 65 + 8.6 (1st) 6.3 (2nd) 6.0* (4th) 5.9* (5th) 6.1* (3rd) 5.7* (7th) 5.9* (6th) 3.5* (9th) 3.9* (8th) 2.6 (10th) * Indicates a different ranking for an offence comparing group to the whole sample.
on rankings, as constructed above. If one were just to compare the offence rankings produced by the two methods either by group or across the entire sample, the positions are almost identical (except for a switch between burglary and marijuana sale which validates the caution used in reporting ranks in Table 2 ) and either form of data analysis seems as good as the other. The problems arise however if we want to compare between groups; for example males, while having a mean rating score for mugging that is lower than females, can be seen in Table 3b to have given mugging a (significantly) higher ranking relative to the other items. A comparison between the 18-25 and 65 + year old groups shows a similar contradiction: based on the ratings, the young see all the offences as less serious, while based on the rankings, the elderly see most of the offences of lesser seriousness as being less serious than do the young. All the findings dealing with differences between groups on the basis of ratings would dissolve and a competing and contradictory set of findings would emerge with the ranking system.
The resolution of this problem is not clear since neither alternative appears to be superior and both make assumptions about the way the respondent uses the scale. In terms of merely presenting the offences from most to least serious, the distinction between rating and ranking seems hardly to matter. It could be argued that since the respondents were given a rating scale and were not in fact told to rank the offences, the ranking method adopted immediately above degrades the measurements given by the respondents, and thus has less legitimacy. Corbett and Simon (1991) found that the police and public shared the same view on the rank seriousness of traffic offences while the public generally rated 'breaking traffic laws' as more serious. One might have to conclude, similarly, that while different social groups are in rough agreement on the relative seriousness of various offences, some of these groups none the less regard all transgressions of the law as objectively more serious. On the other hand, the objections to use of the Likert scale as an (implicitly additive) ratio scale were summarized in the introduction, and cannot be entirely discounted; if these objections are sustainable, it is the mean rankings derived from the scale which should dominate analysis.
Concluding Remarks
This article has presented the results of a crime seriousness survey conducted in Ireland. The study has shown Irish perceptions of crime to have much in common with those in other jurisdictions, and in particular with those in England and Wales surveyed by Levi and Jones (1985) . The study addressed a number of problems that are familiar from the crime seriousness literature. Both the ratings and the rankings given to offences by the respondents were used, in order to compensate for different weaknesses that are inherent in the two approaches. It was sought to elaborate a model of seriousness, which is linked to punitiveness, and embraces dimensions of the wrongfulness and the individual impact of crimes. The level of consensus within the surveyed population, and as between jurisdictions, was assessed. Many of our conclusions are of necessity both tentative and speculative, and hopefully they will be tested by others. We feel that two key research questions arise from separating seriousness into the dimensions of wrongfulness and impact. The first is whether these dimensions also play a role in punitiveness, i.e. is desired sentence severity also determined by varying levels of offence 'badness' and impact? The second potential research issue is that of attempted offences; since attempts can vary widely on badness but may have no actual impact, it would be interesting to examine how a completed offence might compare with an attempted version of the same offence. Would it be reasonable to anticipate that the impact dimension would disappear from attempted offence scenarios?
It has already been indicated that seriousness findings and the degree of social consensus discerned therein can have practical implications for policing and sentencing. In the former case, it may be desired to reallocate police resources from the prevention, detection, and prosecution of crimes which are less serious (or are declining in seriousness) in the public perception to those which are more (or increasingly) so. Even if adopted, such a policy will no doubt be tempered by other considerations, such as frequency of occurrence of different crimes. In sentencing, the imperative of proportionality requires a benchmark by which the relative gravity of crimes can be assessed, which empirical findings in respect of perceived offence seriousness can provide (see Walker and Hough 1988) . In turn, any lack of equivalence between sentences currently imposed and the perceived seriousness of offences may constitute a ground for criticism of present practice.
